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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to identify and explain eects of a government spend-
ing shock. After accounting for large military events, I nd that in response to a
structural unanticipated government spending shock, output, hours, consumption and
wages all rise, whereas investment falls on impact. I construct and estimate a dynamic
general equilibrium model featuring deep habit formation and show that it successfully
explains these eects. In particular, deep habits give rise to countercyclical markups
and thus act as transmission mechanism for the eects of government spending shocks
on private consumption and wages. In addition, I show that deep habits signicantly
improve the t of the model compared to a model with habit formation at the level of
aggregate goods.
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1 Introduction
Recently in public debates, there is renewed interest in the role scal instruments play in
stabilizing the economy and about the dynamic eects of discretionary scal policy. I am
interested in the latter question and the objective of this paper is to identify and explain the
eects of government spending shocks in an estimated model.
While many studies have focused on using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models to analyze consequences of monetary policy and have had great success, I would like
to study the eects of scal policy in a similar framework. In this paper, I start by showing
that since most pre-existing models are not suitable for studying scal shocks, understanding
the eects of an unexpected increase in government purchases is additionally of particular
interest for assessing empirical validity of competing macroeconomic models.
In the case of scal policy, identication of shocks is complicated due to the fact that
there are usually lags between the announcement of a change in spending or taxes, and
the actual implementation once the legislation passes through Congress. Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) show that government spending does not react to other contemporaneous
macroeconomic variables automatically and so government spending shocks can be identied
by a recursive ordering with government spending ordered rst in a vector autoregression
(VAR).1 In an alternative approach, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identied spending shocks by
events that signal large military buildups in US history. Ramey (2008) shows that these dates
of military buildup Granger-cause the identied structural shocks. Since these events can
be thought of as anticipated increases in government defense spending, I have put together
both identication schemes to construct structural spending shocks which are independent
of any information in the identied military buildup episodes. I nd that in response to an
unexpected rise in government spending, output, consumption, wages and hours worked, all
go up, whereas investment declines on impact.
1This is the same approach followed by Fatas and Mihov (2001), Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007)
and Perotti (2007).
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Baxter and King (1993) show that in a simple real business cycle model with lump-
sum taxes, when government spending rises, households face higher taxes and due to the
negative wealth eects, they inevitably lower their consumption and increase hours worked.
This increase in labor supply also causes real wages to fall. Thus, these models are unable to
generate the positive response of consumption and wages to a government spending shock.
Some recent studies have recognized this shortcoming of the existing models and have
had varying degree of success in qualitatively matching the response of a few variables of
interest. For instance, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show that in a model with sticky
prices, in response to a rise in aggregate demand, rms raise labor demand, which puts
upward pressure on wages. However, even in the case where labor demand rises suciently
to overcome the rise in labor supply, and we see wages going up, it does not necessarily
lead to a positive response of consumption. Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) introduce
a model that does a fairly good job at matching the qualitative responses of wages and
consumption. In addition to sticky prices, they model non-competitive behavior in labor
markets and a fraction of the economy consisting of rule of thumb consumers who can not
borrow and save, and consume their entire current income each period. If close to half
of all consumers in the economy are assumed to be credit constrained, they get a positive
response of consumption to a government spending shock. However, the empirical relevance
of this explanation has been questioned by Coenen and Straub (2005) who estimate this
model with credit constrained consumers for the Euro area. They nd the estimated share
of rule-of-thumb consumer being relatively low, and unable to generate a positive response
of consumption to a government spending shock.2
An alternative approach that can successfully predict the positive responses of wages and
consumption in response to a government spending shock is introduced in Ravn, Schmitt-
2Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) also estimate a DSGE model with rule-of-thumb consumers for Euro
data, but model taxes and composition of government spending dierently, and get a positive response of
consumption. Lopez-Salido and Rabanal (2006) carry out a similar estimation exercise for US data, but they
also include non-separable preferences in their framework. They show that allowing for this complementarity
between consumption and hours worked leads to a small estimated fraction of rule of thumb consumers, and
these two features can work together to give a positive response of consumption.
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Grohe, and Uribe (2006). They develop a model of deep habits in an economy with imper-
fectly competitive product markets. Deep habits imply that households form habits over
narrowly dened categories of consumption goods, such as cars, clothing etc. This feature
gives rise to a demand function with a price-elastic component that depends on aggregate
consumption demand, and a perfectly price-inelastic component. An increase in aggregate
demand in the form of government purchases increases the share of the price-elastic com-
ponent, and so this rise in price elasticity induces the rms to reduce the markup of price
over marginal cost.3 Thus labor demand goes up and if the labor demand exceeds labor
supply, wages go up in response to a government spending shock. This higher real wage
causes individuals to substitute away from leisure towards consumption, resulting in a rise
in consumption. I incorporate this mechanism, which has not been explored to a great extent
in the context of models explaining the US economy, in my theoretical model.4
In contrast to most of the aforementioned studies and others which typically involve only
qualitatively matching the impact responses of a few particular variables to a public spend-
ing shock, I am undertaking a more complete analysis where rstly instead of calibrating
the parameters of the model, I estimate them using evidence from the US data, and sec-
ondly I also account for responses of a broader variety of key macroeconomic variables.5 I
am considering a medium scale DSGE model with several nominal and real rigidities that
capture the high degree of persistence characterizing macroeconomic time series, developed
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), which has been shown to t the data well
along dierent dimensions. The specic departure in this paper is the introduction of deep
3In an earlier paper, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) also model countercyclical markups in order to
generate a rise in real wage along with output in response to demand shocks, with strategic interactions
between colluding rms.
4Recently, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007) have used deep habits in an open economy model and
shown that it helps to explain the responses of consumption and exchange rate to a domestic public spending
shock.
5Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) is similar in spirit as they quantitatively match impulse re-
sponse functions of several macro variables to a government spending shock. However, the fundamental
dierence is the identication scheme they use to identify government spending shock which relies on nar-
rative evidence on episodes of military buildup presented in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). They also consider
distortionary taxes in their model, whereas in this paper I am only considering lump-sum taxes, however
considering distortionary taxation is an extension worth pursuing in future work.
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habits, as a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks.
The model is estimated using a Laplace type estimator suggested by Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003), which are dened similarly to Bayesian estimators, but instead of the para-
metric likelihood function, one can use a general statistical criterion function. In this paper,
I am using the distance between the impulse response function implied by the empirical
model and the ones generated by theoretical model. The estimation results suggest that the
model does a great job at quantitatively accounting for the estimated responses of the US
economy to a public spending shock. In particular, in comparison to a model with supercial
habits, the model with deep habits produces impulse responses that are signicantly better
at matching the magnitude and persistence of the empirical responses for all variables of
interest, most notably consumption and real wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical evidence
regarding the eects of government spending shocks. Section 3 describes the theoretical
model with deep habits. In Section 4, I provide the description of the estimation procedure
used. Section 5 presents the estimation results and dynamics for both models with supercial
and deep habits, Section 6 compares deep habits with other mechanisms for government
spending shocks explored in the literature and nally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section describes how the government spending shocks are identied, and shows the
responses of the various macroeconomic variables to this shock.
2.1 Identication
In this section I analyze the eects of government spending shocks. There are two approaches
that have primarily been used in the literature to identify these shocks, and have seemingly
dierent predictions. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use information from historical accounts
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and identied the government spending shocks as dates where large increases in defense
spending were anticipated. The military date variable, Dt, takes value of 1 in the following
quarters: 1950:3, 1965:1 and 1980:1, which correspond with the start of the Korean War, the
Vietnam war and the Carter-Reagen buildup respectively. Recently September 11th, 2001
has also been added to the list.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify a government spending shock by using institutional
information to show that government spending is predetermined relative to other macroe-
conomic variables and does not respond contemporaneously to output, consumption etc. in
quarterly data. This identication scheme is implemented by ordering government spending
rst in a VAR and using a Choleski decomposition.
With government spending shocks, implementation lags is a major concern since there
may be delay between the announcement and the actual implementation of a government
spending change. Ramey (2008) shows that the structurally identied government spending
shocks are Granger caused by the lags of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy, as evidence that the
structurally identied shocks are in fact not entirely unanticipated.
In this paper, in order to capture unanticipated government spending shocks, I combine
the two approaches. For this purpose I use the new narrative evidence presented in Ramey
(2008), that is much richer than the Ramey-Shapiro military dates, as it includes additional
events when the newspapers started forecasting signicant changes in government spending,
is no longer a binary dummy variable, and for the dates identied, it equals the present
discounted value of the anticipated change in government spending. Since I am interested
in unanticipated changes in government spending, I run the following reduced form VAR,
Yt = 0 + 1t+ A(L)Yt 1 +B(L)Rt + ut; (1)
where 0 is a constant, 1 is the coecient of the time trend, Yt is a vector of the variables of
interest, Rt is the new Ramey variable and ut is the reduced form shock. The unanticipated
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government spending shock is then identied by government spending being ordered rst
in Yt and then using Choleski decomposition. Note, that in contrast to the approach of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), due to the addition of the Ramey variables and its lags on the
right hand side of the equation, the structurally identied shock in this case is orthogonal to
the episodes identied in the narrative approach, and thus captures unanticipated changes
in government spending 6. In this specication A(L) and B(L) are polynomials of degree
4.7 The data spans 1954:3-2008:4, where the starting date is based on availability of federal
funds rate data. Yt is a vector of the following endogenous variables:
Yt = [gt yt ht ct it wt t Rt]
0
where gt is logarithm of real per capita government spending, yt is logarithm of real per
capita GDP, ht is logarithm of per capita hours worked, ct is logarithm of real per capita
consumption expenditure on nondurables and services, it is the logarithm of real per capita
gross domestic investment and consumption expenditures on durables, wt is logarithm of
real wages in the non-farm business sector, t is GDP deator ination and Rt is the federal
funds rate.8
2.2 Empirical Findings
The impulse responses of the macro variables in Yt to the government spending shock are
shown in Figure 1. The shock is a one standard error shock to government spending, and
the impulse responses are shown with 95 % condence bands constructed by Monte Carlo
simulations. The response function are shown for a horizon of 20 quarters.
Notice that the government spending shock is extremely persistent. Output rises signi-
6This was rst suggested to me by Martin Uribe. Since then Jordi Gali has made the same point in his
NBER discussion of Ramey (2008).
7Akaike and Schwartz criterion support lags lengths of 2 and 1 respectively. The empirical results shown
here are robust to these lag lengths.
8All the data sources are provided in the Appendix.
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cantly in response to a positive government spending shock. Hours also rise to a signicant
degree with a slight delay. Investment falls initially and rises after 4 quarters, but the re-
sponse is insignicant for all horizons following the impact response. The two variables of
interest and controversy in the scal literature, consumption and wages, both rise in re-
sponse to this shock. Most of the variables have a hump-shaped response which is extremely
persistent and peaks between 10-12 quarters after the shock hits the economy.
The responses shown are broadly consistent with the ones shown in Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), which employ
similar identication schemes, even though the sample size has been updated to include
recent data. The impact government spending multiplier for GDP found here is 0.94, which is
similar in magnitude to 0.90 found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and slightly greater than
1 found by Fatas and Mihov (2001). All these studies also nd consumption and wages rising
signicantly in response to a government spending shock. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use an
agnostic identication procedure based on sign restrictions to identify government spending
shocks, and nd a weak positive response for consumption, and a weak, mostly insignicant
response for real wages.9 As far as the response of investment is concerned, Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) nd that investment declines signicantly for the rst ve quarters. Similarly,
Fatas and Mihov (2001) also nd an initial decline in the response of investment before it
starts rising, even though their measure of investment excludes durable consumption. They
also show that the main component of investment driving this initial drop is non-residential
investment. While Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use a dierent identication scheme, they
also nd residential and non-residential investment crowded out by a government spending
shock.10
9Studies that employ the narrative approach to identifying government spending shocks, like Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), typically nd product wages falling
signicantly and an insignicant response for wages deated by GDP deator. While Ramey (2008) nds
consumption being crowded out, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (2004) nd an insignicant response for consumption.
10Narrative studies usually nd gross private investment rising on impact and falling with a delay in
response to a spending shock.
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Since the ndings here are very similar to the ones of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
Fatas and Mihov (2001), this seems to suggest that the anticipation eects captured by the
Ramey variable in the VAR given by equation (1) are not very signicant.11
Ination and nominal interest rate fall in response to the government spending shock, even
though the condence bands are large and the responses are insignicant at most horizons.
At rst sight, these responses seem counter-intuitive but have been observed by previous
empirical studies as well. Fatas and Mihov (2001) show GDP deator falling and real T-bill
rate rising in response to a government spending shock. Perotti (2002) studies the eects
of government spending shocks in OECD countries, and nds that ination and the 10 year
nominal interest rate in the US either have insignicant or negative responses. Mountford
and Uhlig (2002) meanwhile employ sign restrictions for identication, and also nd both
GDP deator and nominal interest rates falling in response to a government expenditure
shock.
3 Model
I am considering a model economy that has been studied in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), which is rich in elements that are shown
to match the empirical response of the economy to monetary and technology shocks. This
model consists of nominal frictions like sticky prices and sticky wages and real rigidities,
namely investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization and imperfect competition
in factor and product markets. In this paper, since the response of macroeconomic variables
to a government spending shock is of particular interest, I introduce deep habits, for which
the motivation was given in the introduction.
11The appendix shows the impulse response functions for the case of both including and excluding Rt , the
Ramey variable, in equation(1). There are no signicant dierences between the two.
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3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of measure one indexed
by j 2 [0; 1]. Each household j 2 [0; 1] maximizes lifetime utility function,
E0
1X
t=0
t

U(xc;jt ; h
j
t) + V (x
g
t )
	
; (2)
The preferences are over consumption and leisure, and take the following form,
U(xct ; ht) =
[(xct)
a(1  ht)1 a]1    1
1  
where   0 is the coecient of relative risk aversion, or the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The parameter,  controls the eect of leisure on the marginal
utility of consumption.12 If  > 1, it implies Uch > 0, i.e. leisure and consumption are gross
substitutes and an increase in hours worked increases marginal utility of consumption. This
also means that wages will have a positive eect on consumption growth, so that when real
wage rate rises, leisure will decline and consumption will rise. On the other hand,  < 1
implies Uch < 0, raising hours worked decreases marginal utility of consumption.
Households also derive utility from consumption of government provided goods, given by
xgt here, which is separable from private consumption and leisure. This means that public
spending does not aect the marginal utility of private consumption or leisure. This is
a common assumption in the literature, and studies such as Aschauer (1985), Ni (1995)
and McGrattan (1994) who examine whether in fact private and public consumption are
substitutes or complements nd mixed and inconclusive results.
The variable xct is a composite of habit adjusted consumption of a continuum of dier-
12If  = 1, it implies a separable, logarithmic utility function of the form, a log xct + (1   a) log (1  ht):
Note Uch = 0 in this case, and so the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the choice of labor.
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entiated goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1],
xc;jt =
Z 1
0
(cjit   bcsCit 1)1 
1
 di
1=(1  1

)
; (3)
where sCit 1 denotes the stock of habit in consuming good i in period t. The parameter b
c 2
[0; 1) measures the degree of external habit formation, and when bc is zero, the households
do not exhibit deep habit formation. The stock of external habit is assumed to depend on
a weighted average of consumption in all past periods. Habits are assumed to evolve over
time according to the law of motion,
sCit = 
csCit 1 + (1  c)cit: (4)
The parameter c 2 [0; 1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit
to variations in the cross-sectional average level of consumption of variety i. When c takes
the value zero, habit is measured by past consumption. As will become apparent later, this
slow decay in habit allows for persistence in the markup movements.
For any given level of consumption of xc;jt , purchases of each individual variety of goods
i 2 [0; 1] in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing total expenditure, R 1
0
Pitcitdi,
subject to the aggregation constraint (3), where Pit denotes the nominal price of a good of
variety i at time t. The optimal level of cjit for i 2 [0; 1] is then given by
cjit =

Pit
Pt
 
xc;jt + b
csCit 1; (5)
where Pt is a nominal price index dened as
Pt 
Z 1
0
P 1 it di
 1
1 
:
Note that consumption of each variety is decreasing in its relative price, Pit=Pt and increasing
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in level of habit adjusted consumption xc;jt . Notice that the demand function in equation
(5) has a price-elastic component that depends on aggregate consumption demand, and the
second term is perfectly price-inelastic. An increase in aggregate demand increases the share
of the price-elastic component, and thus an increase in the elasticity of demand, inducing
a decline in the mark-ups. In addition to this, rms also take into account that today's
price decisions will aect future demand, as is apparent due to sit 1 term, and so when the
present value of future per unit prot are expected to be high, rms have an incentive to
invest in the customer base today. Thus, this gives them an additional incentive to appeal
to a broader customer base by reducing markups in the current period.
Each household provides a dierentiated labor service and faces a demand for labor given
by
 
W jt =Wt
 ~
hdt . Here W
j
t denotes the nominal wage charged by household j at time t, Wt
is an index of nominal wages prevailing in the economy, and hdt is a measure of aggregate
labor demand by rms. At this given wage, the household j is assumed to supply enough
labor, hjt , to satisfy demand,
hjt =
 
wjt
wt
! ~
hdt ; (6)
where wjt  W jt =Pt and wt  Wt=Pt.
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to
the following law of motion,
kjt+1 = (1  )kjt + ijt
"
1  S
 
ijt
ijt 1
!#
; (7)
where ijt denotes investment by household j and  is a parameter denoting the rate of
depreciation of physical capital. The function S introduces investment adjustment costs and
has the following functional form, S

it
it 1

= 
2

it
it 1
  1
2
, and therefore in the steady state
it satises S = S 0 = 0 and S 00 > 0. These assumptions imply the absence of adjustment
costs up to rst-order in the vicinity of the deterministic steady state.
Owners of physical capital can control the intensity at which this factor is utilized. For-
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mally, let ut measure capacity utilization in period t. It is assumed that using the stock of
capital with intensity ut entails a cost of a(ut)kt units of the composite nal good.
13 House-
holds rent the capital stock to rms at the real rental rate rkt per unit of capital. Total
income stemming from the rental of capital is given by rkt utkt.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal state-contingent
assets. Specically, each period t  0, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent
nominal payment Aht+1 in period t + 1 at the dollar cost Etrt;t+1A
h
t+1. The variable rt;t+1
denotes a stochastic nominal discount factor between periods t and t + 1. Households pay
real lump-sum taxes in the amount t per period.
The household's period-by-period budget constraint is then given by:
Etrt;t+1a
j
t+1 + x
c;j
t + !
j
t + i
j
t + a(u
j
t)k
j
t + t =
ajt
t
+ rkt u
j
tk
j
t + w
j
t
 
wjt
wt
! ~
hdt + t; (8)
where !t = b
c
R 1
0
Pits
C
it 1=Ptdi. The variable a
j
t=t denotes the real payo in period t of
nominal state-contingent assets purchased in period t 1. The variable t denotes dividends
received from the ownership of rms and t  Pt=Pt 1 denotes the gross rate of consumer-
price ination.
The wage-setting decision of the household is subject to a Calvo-type lottery where a
household can not reset optimal wages in a fraction ~ 2 [0; 1) of labor markets. In these
markets, the wage rate is indexed to last period's ination, so wjt = w
j
t 1t 1.
3.2 Government
Each period t  0, nominal government spending is given by Ptgt. Real government ex-
penditures, denoted by gt are assumed to be exogenous, stochastic and follow a univariate
13In steady state, u is set to be equal to 1, and so a(u) = 0. The parameter of interest, which determines
dynamics is a00(1)=a0(1) = a.
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rst-order autoregressive process,14
g^t = ~gg^t 1 + 
g
t ; (9)
where gt is a government spending shock.
15
Like households, the government is also assumed to form habits over its consumption of
individual varieties of goods. This can be thought of as the government favoring transac-
tions with vendors that supplied public goods in the past. Or alternatively, we can think of
households deriving utility from public goods that is additively separable from private con-
sumption and leisure, and they exhibit good-by-good habit formation for public goods also.
The government allocates spending over individual varieties of goods, git, so as to maximize
the quantity of composite good produced with the dierentiated varieties of goods according
to the relation,
xgt =
Z 1
0
(git   bgsGit 1)1 1=di
1=(1 1=)
:
The variable sGit denotes the government's stock of habit in good i and is assumed to evolve
as follows,
sGit = 
gsGit 1 + (1  g)git: (10)
The government's problem consists in choosing git, i 2 [0; 1], so as to maximize xgt subject
to the budget constraint
R 1
0
Pitgitdi  Ptgt, taking as given the initial condition git = gt, for
t =  1 and all i. The resulting demand function for each dierentiated good i 2 [0; 1] by
the public sector is,
git =

Pit
Pt
 
xgt + b
gsGit 1: (11)
Government spending expenditures are assumed to be nanced by lump-sum taxes. Note
that since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model, the path of debt becomes irrelevant.
14In the sensitivity analysis section, a process for government spending with feedback from other variables,
as in the VAR, is also considered.
15A hatted variable denotes log deviation of a variable from its steady state.
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The monetary authority is assumed to use a Taylor rule of the following form, where
there is interest rate smoothing and nominal interest rate responds to deviations of ination
and output from steady state levels.
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R) (^t + yy^t) : (12)
3.3 Firms
Each variety of nal goods is produced by a single rm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each rm i 2 [0; 1] produces output using capital services, kit, and labor
services, hit as factor inputs . The production technology is given by,
F (kit; hit)   ;
where the function F is assumed to be homogenous of degree one, concave, and strictly
increasing in both arguments and has the following functional form,
F (k; h) = kh1 :
The parameter  > 0 introduces xed costs of operating a rm in each period, and are
modeled to ensure a realistic prot-to-output ratio in steady state.
The rm is assumed to satisfy demand at the posted price. Formally,
F (kit; hit)    ait; (13)
where ait is aggregate absorption of good i and includes cit, git and iit. The objective of
the rm is to choose contingent plans for Pit, hit, and kit so as to maximize the present
15
discounted value of dividend payments, given by
Et
1X
s=0
rt;t+sPt+sit+s;
where,
it =
Pit
Pt
ait   rkt kit   wthit  

2

Pit
Pit 1
  t 1
2
;
subject to (11), (5), and the demand function for investment faced by rm i. Note that
sluggish price adjustment is introduced following Rotemberg (1982), by assuming that the
rms face a quadratic price adjustment cost for the good it produces. This is because the
introduction of deep habits makes the pricing problem dynamic and accounting for additional
dynamics arising from Calvo-Yun type price stickiness makes aggregation non-trivial.
4 Estimation Strategy
In this section, the estimation methodology is discussed. To make comparison with existing
studies easier, the strategy followed in this paper is to calibrate most of the parameters
to match the estimates in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).16 The parameters
of interest in the transmission of government spending shocks are the habit formation re-
lated parameters, preference parameter and the autoregressive parameter for the government
spending process, and these are all estimated.
The group of parameters that are calibrated are shown in Table 1. These include the
discount factor , set at 1:03 1=4, which implies a steady-state annualized real interest rate
of 3 percent. The depreciation rate, , is set at 0:025, which implies an annual rate of
depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent.  is set at 0:36, which corresponds to a steady
state share of capital income roughly equal to 36%. Also, the steady state labor is set at 0:5
that implies a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to unity and the share of government
16An additional concern is the identication of parameters, and the dynamics of the model in response to
a government spending shock may fail to contain information about certain parameters.
16
spending in aggregate output is taken at 0:20, that matches the average share of government
spending in GDP over the sample period considered in this paper.
The labor elasticity of substitution, ~ is set at 21, which implies the markup of wages
over marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption being 5 percent. The
goods elasticity of substitution,  is calibrated to be 5:3 which implies a steady state price
markup of 23 percent in the case of supercial habits. However, the steady state value of
markup over prices in the case with deep habits is eventually pinned down by the estimated
degree of deep habits.
The capacity utilization parameter, a is calibrated to be 0:01, and the investment ad-
justment cost is set at 2:48. These are values taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). The wage stickiness parameter ~ is calibrated to be 0.92. Note, that typically utility
is dened as a function of a single dierentiated type of labor. However, here utility is dened
as a function of an aggregate of dierent types of labor, similar to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2005). As shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), in this variant of wage stickiness
the parameter needs to be higher than the corresponding wage stickiness parameter in the
set-up in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) to obtain the same wage Phillips curve.
The parameter value of 0:92 maps into the value estimated in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) equal to 0.64.
The price stickiness parameter is calibrated to be 17. Recall, that price stickiness is
modeled as a quadratic price adjustment cost. The mapping between the Phillips curve
implied by a model with a price adjustment cost to the one arising in the Calvo-Yun price
stickiness model, suggests that the average duration of price contracts is close to three
quarters, as estimated in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
Lastly, the parameters in the monetary policy rule are calibrated to be consistent with
post-1979 era estimates in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000); the interest rate smoothing
parameter is set to be 0.8, and the coecients on ination and output are calibrated to be
1.5 and 0.1 respectively.
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The set of parameters being estimated are: fbc; c; bg; g; ; ~gg. I allow for varying degree
of deep habit formation in private consumption and public consumption, denoted by bc and
bg respectively. Similarly, the speed of adjustment of habit formation is dierent for public
and private consumption, given by c and g.
To estimate the parameters of interest, I apply the Laplace type estimator (LTE) sug-
gested by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003), which are dened similarly to Bayesian estimators,
but use general statistical criterion function instead of the parametric likelihood function.
Chernuzhukov and Hong show that these estimators are as ecient as the classical extremum
estimators, while being computationally more attractive. The estimates are the mean values
of a Markov chain sequence of draws from the quasi-posterior distribution of , generated by
the tailored Metropolis Hastings algorithm. For the proposal distribution in the algorithm,
the initial value of parameters are optimized values generated by running cmaes-dsge.m,17and
the variance is given by the inverse Hessian matrix computed numerically.
The LTE of the vector , minimizes the quasi posterior risk function,
 = arg inf
2
[Qn()]
where the quasi posterior function is dened as,
Qn() =
Z
2
n(   )pn()d
Here n(:) is the appropriate penalty function associated with an incorrect choice of param-
eter, and pn is the quasi-posterior distribution, dened using the Laplace transformation of
17This is an optimization routine adapted for use with DSGE models by Martin Andreasen (in Andreasen
(2008)), who was kind enough to provide the MATLAB code.
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the distance function Ln and the prior probability of the parameter .
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pn() =
eLn()()R
eLn()()d
The distance function Ln() is the weighted sum of squares of the dierence between the
impulse responses generated by the empirical VAR model, ^IRF , and the ones generated by
the theoretical model, IRF ().
Ln() =  (IRF ()  ^IRF n)0V  1(IRF ()  ^IRF n)
Here V is a diagonal weighting matrix with the sample variances of the impulse responses
along the diagonal.19
The reported estimates are the mean values and standard deviation of the Markov chain
sequence of 500,000 draws, which guarantees convergence, with the rst 100,000 values burnt
out. These draws are generated by the Metropolis Hastings algorithm with an acceptance
rate of between 20-30%.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Parameter Estimates and Dynamics in Model with Supercial
Habits
Deep habits and supercial habits give rise to the same Euler equation. However, the
dierences arise in the supply side of the problem. To distinguish between the two, the model
was rst estimated with supercial habits, so that there is habit formation at the level of
the aggregate consumption basket instead of on a good-by-good basis. More precisely, the
18I use at priors, where parameters are restricted to be within the permissible domain, e.g. the deep
habit parameters are restricted to be within the unit interval, [0,1).
19I am matching impulse responses for 20 periods but a more ecient number of lag length can be
determined using the statistical criterion suggested in Hall, Inoue, Nason, and Rossi (2007).
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utility function is now,
U(ct   bct 1; ht)
where b is the supercial habit formation parameter. With supercial habits in place, the
model is not very dierent from the standard medium scale model, considered in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) to cite a few.20
The results are shown in Figure 2, and the estimates for the model with supercial
habits are shown in Table 2. The habit formation parameter estimated is much higher than
in previous studies and tends to 0.96. The preference parameter,  is estimated to be 5:9
which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of close to 0.17. The autoregressive
parameter, ~g, in the government spending process is estimated to be 0.96.
Note rst that even though the model has nominal rigidities in the form of price and
wage stickiness, in addition to variable capacity utilization and investment adjustment cost,
the responses are short-lived and not persistent enough to match the empirical evidence.
Secondly, the model is able to match the increase in output and fall in investment on impact.
However, the response of consumption and wages seem at, and in the case of consumption,
outside the 95% condence bands. In Figure 4, some of the responses in the estimated model
are magnied for clarication.
In the model I have abstracted from distortionary taxes and the government only relies
on lump-sum taxes. The government spending shock therefore leads to a negative wealth
eect since households face higher taxes. This induces them to increase hours worked, so
labor supply goes up, and reduce consumption. These are the eects seen in standard RBC
models. In the presence of price stickiness, as shown in Linnemann and Schabert (2003),
labor demand goes up in response to a demand shock, and it is possible to see wages rise
on impact depending on the monetary policy regime as characterized by the coecients in
the Taylor rule. However, they also show that price stickiness alone does not generate a
suciently large price markup mechanism to lead consumption to rise.
20The complete set of symmetric equilibrium conditions for this case are given in the Appendix.
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Since output rises in response to the spending shock, where both capital and labor are
inputs in the production function, and investment falls, eective capital, utkt rises in response
to the shock. A rise in capacity utilization after the shock hits the economy also shifts the
marginal product of labor so that this adds another mechanism for the labor demand to shift
suciently for us to see a rise in wage in response to the demand shock.
Ultimately, since the preferences are non-separable, and  is estimated to be greater than
1, the small rise in wages ensures that agents substitute from leisure towards consumption,
and at least on impact, this overcomes the negative wealth eect and consumption rises as
a result. However, as is clear in Figure 4, these eects are all very small in magnitude and
do not help to quantitatively or qualitatively match the empirical responses in the long run,
and for the case of consumption in particular, the discrepancy between the data and model
implied responses is rather severe.
5.2 Parameter Estimates and Dynamics in Model with Deep Habits
Next the model is estimated with deep habits and Table 2 presents the estimation results.
The deep habit parameters are estimated to be 0.74 and 0.69 for habit formation in private
consumption and public consumption respectively. The degree of deep habit formation
in household consumption is close to estimates of habits at the level of composite good
in the existing literature. The parameters c and g measure the speed of adjustment of
the stock of external habit to variation in cross-sectional levels of consumption of a given
variety. The estimated values of both these parameters is signicantly high, indicating that
high persistence in markups is needed to match the empirical responses, since wages and
consumption do not have a big impact response to the demand shock but peak after 10
or so quarters. The estimated values of deep habit formation parameters imply the steady
state value of markup of price over marginal costs being 27%, which is within the range of
empirical evidence presented in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The coecient of relative risk aversion is estimated to be 4:39. This suggests that con-
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sumption and leisure are substitutes, and the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is 0.22. Even though the empirical evidence is not so clear for this parameter, this estimated
value seems to be in line with existing empirical studies.21
Figure 3 shows the impulse response implied by the model. Note that the estimated
model does a reasonably good job at matching the empirical responses. All of the model
responses lie within the two-standard deviation condence intervals of the data. The model
is in particular, successful in quantitatively matching the persistent responses of wages and
consumption.
In addition to the wealth eects discussed in the previous section, due to deep habits,
recall from equation (11), the demand faced by rm i from the public sector in period t is
of the form,
git =

Pit
Pt
 
(gt   bgsGt 1) + bgsGit 1;
and there is a similar demand function for private consumption. The demand function has
a price-elastic component that depends on aggregate public consumption demand, and the
second term is perfectly price-inelastic. An increase in aggregate demand increases the share
of the price-elastic component, and thus an increase in the elasticity of demand, inducing
a decline in the mark-ups. In addition to this, rms also take into account that today's
price decisions will aect future demand, and so when the present value of future per unit
prot are expected to be high, rms have an incentive to invest in the customer base today.
Thus, they induce higher current sales via a decline in the current markup. If producers
have market power and are able to set price above the marginal cost, then one of the rm's
optimality condition look as follows, F2(utkt; h
d
t ) = twt. Here t is the ratio of price to
marginal cost, and with imperfect competition, variations in the markup shift the labor
demand and therefore, wages increase with output as a result of an increase in demand.22
21For instance, Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1997) use microdata to estimate the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of 0.18, and Hall (1988) employs macrodata and concludes that intertemporal
elasticity is most likely less than 0.2.
22This countercyclicality of the price markup has been empirically documented by Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1999) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2007) among others. Monacelli and Perotti (2008), in fact,
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This higher real wage cause individuals to substitute away from leisure to consumption, and
this substitution eect is large enough to oset the negative wealth eect so that overall
consumption rises signicantly in response to a government spending shock.
If there is a positive shock to government spending, there are two basic eects: rstly,
there is an increase in output supply brought about by the negative wealth eect on labor
supply. Secondly, there is an increase in aggregate demand due to a crowding in of con-
sumption. Both these eects raise output, but their relative size determines what happens
to prices. There is a drop in ination in the model since the rms lower markups in re-
sponse to an increase in aggregate demand. The drop in ination is inertial due to the slow
decay of stock of habit, and eventually reverts back to steady state as aggregate demand
comes back to normal. Overall, the monetary variables do not have signicant responses to
a government spending shock. Given the monetary policy parameters, there is an aggressive
anti-inationary rule with a signicant response to output, which leads to an increase in the
real interest rate on impact. Since this rise is not signicant, the households do not face
large intertemporal substitution eects.
Notice that the empirical results show investment falling on impact and rising to be
point-wise positive after 6 quarters. The model with deep habits is able to match the initial
drop in investment, but not the subsequent rise, although the theoretical response from the
baseline model is within the condence bands. The rise in labor supply as a result of a
spending shock induces a rise in marginal product of capital, and thus as the rental cost of
capital goes up, there is a corresponding fall in investment.
also show this fall in the markup in response to a government spending shock in a SVAR.
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6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Government spending process
In the model, government spending is modeled as an AR(1) process. Next, I consider if the
results are robust to the assumption of scal policy taking the form of a feedback rule, given
by the rst equation of the VAR system given in equation(1). This means, the process for
government spending is,
g^t = A
1(L)Y^t 1 + 
g
t (14)
where A1(L) denotes the rst row of A(L), and Y^t = [g^t y^t h^t c^t i^t w^t ^t R^t]
0.
The values assigned to A1(L) are the same as estimated in Section 2, but the behavior of
the endogenous variables appearing in the process is dictated by the model's dynamics. This
explains any discrepancy between the theoretical and empirical impulse responses of gt.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses implied by a model with deep habits estimated with
this feedback rule for government spending in place. The estimates are given in Table 2. The
estimated degree of deep habit formation in public and private consumption is slightly higher
than the baseline case but the preference parameter is estimated close to 3, which is lower
than 4.4, the value in the baseline case. Overall, the impulse response functions once again
match the empirical responses, for the most part, just as successfully as the specication
with an AR(1) process for government spending.
6.2 Role of markup
The key in using deep habits as a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks,
is that they induce time-varying countercyclical movements in the markup of prices over
marginal costs. However, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) criticize deep habits on the basis of
giving rise to private consumption and markup responses that are counterfactually small and
large, respectively. This raises questions about the size of markup dynamics in the estimated
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model with deep habits.
Figure 5 shows the response of markup, along with consumption and wages in the esti-
mated model. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) provide empirical evidence on the response of
markups in the non-nancial corporate business and manufacturing sectors. In response to a
1 percentage point of GDP increase in government spending, they nd consumption peaking
at 0:5 percentage points of GDP and markup falling by between 0:5 and 1 percent. If the
responses in the model are normalized similarly by average share of the variable in GDP,
then the model predicts that consumption peaks at a little over 0:3 percentage points of
GDP and the markup falls by about 0:5 percent, in response to a 1 percentage point of GDP
increase in government spending. The model dynamics are thus in line with their ndings.
7 Other Transmission Mechanisms for Government Spend-
ing Shocks
In standard neoclassical models, as shown in Baxter and King (1993) when government
spending rises, households face higher taxes and due to the negative wealth eect, they
inevitably lower their consumption and increase hours worked. In these perfectly competitive
models, aggregate demand shocks, such as government spending shocks increase employment
only by aecting the household's willingness to supply labor and do not aect rm's demand
for labor at any given real wage. Thus, these models are unable to generate the positive
response of consumption and wages to a government spending shock.
In order to get the positive responses for consumption and wages, the literature has
focused on several dierent strategies. Linnemann (2006) gets a positive response for con-
sumption by considering a utility function that is non-separable in leisure and consumption.
When hours worked increased, since leisure and consumption are substitutes, marginal util-
ity of consumption rises. Therefore, there is a comovement between hours worked and
consumption, but wages still fall. However, Bilbiie (2006) shows that if one relies on these
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non-separable preferences, it must be the case that consumption is an inferior good, and
that the positive co-movement between consumption and hours is possible only if either
consumption or leisure is inferior.
Bouakez and Rebei (2007) consider a simple RBC model where preferences depend on
public and private spending, and households are habit forming. If private and govern-
ment spending are Edgeworth complements, an increases in government spending raises the
marginal utility of household consumption, allowing consumption to rise as a result of a
spending shock. However, the authors also cite several empirical studies which have esti-
mated the degree of substitutability between private and public spending and generally lead
to inconclusive results.
In the two aforementioned studies, the focus has been the response of consumption,
and since labor demand is unchanged, real wages fall in the model. Other modications
of the neoclassical model rely on mechanisms for government spending to shift the labor
demand curve. If this shift is large enough, it can induce wages to rise, and potentially
lead to a subsequent rise in consumption. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) model imperfect
competition where a small number of rms within an oligopoly collude to keep prices above
marginal cost. This collusion is supported by the threat of reverting back to a lower price
in the future if a member deviates. When there is an increase in current demand, the gains
from undercutting relative to the losses from future punishment are raised. To prevent a
breakdown of collusion, the agreement involves smaller markups in this case. Therefore in
the face of higher aggregate demand, say due to an increase in government spending, the
rms lower markups and increase labor demand, leading to a rise in real wages in the model.
They, however do not show the response for consumption.
In Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996), an increase in government demand raises the
equilibrium number of rms that can operate in the intermediate goods sectors, where they
model increasing returns to specialization. The resulting shift in labor demand can overcome
the increase in labor supply to lead to a higher equilibrium wage. The results, however de-
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pend on the magnitude of markup of price over marginal costs which in the model determines
the degree of returns to specialization. In order to generate a comovement between hours
and wages, and a rise in consumption the required markup is really high, at least 50 percent.
Alternatively, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show that in a model with sticky prices,
in response to a rise in demand due to increased government spending, rms raise labor
demand, which puts upward pressure on wages, in the face of the usual negative wealth
eects raising labor supply. Thus this is also a way of generating countercyclical markups.
If the interest rate rule does not put signicant weight on output, it is possible to see real
wages increase in equilibrium, but this rise is insucient to induce consumption to go up.
Along with sticky prices, Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) model non-competitive
behavior in labor markets and a fraction of the economy consisting of rule-of-thumb con-
sumers who can not borrow and save, and consume their entire current income each period.
In response to a government spending shock, the labor market structure with rms alone
determining employment and price rigidities leads to a signicant rise in wages. With this
increase in wages, the credit constrained consumers raise their consumption. If close to half
of all consumers in the economy are assumed to be credit constrained, they get a positive
response for aggregate consumption to a government spending shock.
Instead of relying on credit constrained consumers, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) consider
a model with sticky prices and households with preferences of the type introduced by Green-
wood, Hercowitz, and Human (1988). These preferences imply that there is virtually no
wealth eect on labor supply, and due to nominal rigidities since the government spending
shock results in an increase in labor demand, this boosts wages to a greater extent than
with standard preferences. Thus, agents substitute away from leisure to consumption, and
it overcomes the negative wealth eect on consumption, and the response of consumption is
further strengthened by the degree of complementarity between labor and consumption im-
plied by the preferences. They show the calibrated model-implied impulse responses along
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with empirical responses for only consumption, wages, markup and investment.23 Their
model can match the initial responses of consumption and wages but has trouble replicating
their persistence. In addition, the model has the most diculty matching the response for
investment which is a prolonged negative response, outside the condence bands after the
rst 3 quarters, relative to the short-lived response in the data.
Deep habits also relies on generating countercyclical markups, but the fall in markup is
sizable relative to markup movements due to price stickiness. Therefore, there is no added
assumption of non-optimizing agents or specic form of preferences needed. This paper in
addition illustrates that once deep habits are embedded in a model that has been shown to t
the data along many dimensions, such as responses to technology and monetary shocks, it can
also successfully explain the eects of government spending shocks on most macroeconomic
variables of interest.24
8 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to identify and explain eects of a government spending shock.
After accounting for events that signal large changes in military spending, in response to
a structural government spending shock, I show that output, consumption, wages all rise
in response, whereas investment, ination and nominal interest rate fall on impact. This
paper shows that commonly used DSGE models with supercial habits are unable to match
the responses of wages and consumption both qualitatively and quantitatively. Once the
model is augmented with deep habits it successfully explains these eects and signicantly
improves the t of the model. Deep habit formation in public and private consumption
play an important role in matching the signicantly positive and persistent responses of
consumption and wages to a government spending shock.
23This model in addition to GHH preferences and sticky prices also has habit formation in consumption
and investment adjustment costs.
24Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2009) show that augmenting a model with nominal rigidities
with deep habits helps to account both for the price puzzle and for ination persistence in response to a
monetary shock.
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The model in this paper has the government relying on lump-sum taxes. One obvious
extension is to consider a more realistic scal setup with distortionary labor and capital
income taxes, where it might also be interesting to explore how in the context of a similar
model, the economy responds to discretionary scal policy, in the form of not just spending
shocks but also tax shocks.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Calibrated value
Share of govt. spending in GDP, G=Y 0.20
Depreciation rate,  0.025
Discount factor,  1:03 1=4
Wage elasticity of demand for specic labor variety, ~ 21
Price elasticity of demand for specic good variety,  5.3
Capital share,  0.36
Capacity utilization parameter, a 0.01
Investment adjustment cost,  2.48
Wage stickiness parameter, ~ 0.92
Price stickiness parameter,  17
Interest rate smoothing parameter, R 0.8
Coecient on ination,  1.5
Coecient on output, Y 0.1
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
Parameter Description Deep Habits Supercial Habits Deep Habits
with feedback rule for gt
bc Deep habit in private consumption 0.74 - 0.83
(0.03) (0.02)
c Speed of adj. of private habit stock 0.89 - 0.76
(0.01) (0.03)
bg Deep habit in public consumption 0.69 - 0.72
(0.04) (0.01)
g Speed of adj. of public habit stock 0.98 - 0.98
(0.001) (0.001)
 Coecient of relative risk aversion 4.39 5.97 3.01
(0.05) (0.15) (0.10)
b Supercial habit persistence parameter - 0.96 -
(0.05)
~g AR(1) coecient for gt 0.97 0.96 -
(0.01) (0.09)
Ln() 402.94 624.91 406.87
Note: The estimates reported are the mean values of the Markov chains, the values in brackets
indicate the standard errors. The last row reports the impulse response function distance
minimizing objective function Ln(), as dened in Section 4, for each model.
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Figure 1: Impulse response function to a one standard deviation government spending shock
as identied in the SVAR.
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Note: The shaded gray regions are the 95 % condence bands constructed by Monte Carlo
simulations.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of the model estimated with supercial habits to a government
spending shock.
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Note: Solid lines are the empirical responses and starred lines are the responses for the estimated
model. The vertical axis has percent deviations from steady state and the horizontal axis
displays number of quarters after the shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the model estimated with deep habits to a government
spending shock.
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Note: Solid lines are the empirical responses and starred lines are the responses for the estimated
model. The vertical axis has percent deviations from steady state and the horizontal axis
displays number of quarters after the shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the model estimated with supercial habits for selected
variables.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of the model estimated with deep habits for selected variables.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of the model with deep habits to a government spending shock,
when the government spending process in the model is given by the VAR equation.
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Note: Solid lines are the empirical responses and starred lines are the responses for the estimated
model. The vertical axis has percent deviations from steady state and the horizontal axis
displays number of quarters after the shock.
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9 Not for Publication Appendix
9.1 Data Appendix
Label Frequency Description Source
GDP Q Gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 1)
GCD Q Personal cons. expenditures on durable goods BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 3)
GCN Q Personal cons. expenditures on nondurable goods BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 4)
GCS Q Personal cons. expenditures on services BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 5)
GPI Q Gross private domestic investment BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 6)
GGE Q Govt. consumption expenditures and gross investment BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 20)
GDPQ Q Real gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.6, Line 1)
P16 Q Civilian non-institutional population, over 16 BLS (LNU00000000Q)
LBMNU Q Non-farm business hours worked BLS (PRS85006033)
LBCPU Q Hourly non-farm business compensation BLS (PRS85006103)
FYFF M Federal funds rate St. Louis FRED
CAPUTIL Q Capacity utilization, Total Index Federal Reserve Board (B50001)
Table 3: Sources of Data Series
Label Description Construction
GDPDEF GDP deator GDPQ/GDP
Gt Real per-capita government spending GGE/P16/GDPDEF
Yt Real per-capita GDP GDPQ/P16
ht Per-capita hours worked LBMNU/P16
ct Real per-capita consumption (GCN+GCS)/P16/GDPDEF
it Real per-capita investment (GPI+GCD)/P16/GDPDEF
wt Real wages LBCPU/GDPDEF
t Ination  GDPDEF
rt Fed funds rate FYFF
ut Capacity utilization CAPUTIL
Table 4: Data used in the VAR. Note that in the VAR, the logs of all series were used, except
for rt and ut.
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9.2 Impulse response functions with and without the Ramey vari-
able
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Figure 7: Impulse response function to a one standard deviation government spending shock
as identied in the baseline SVAR (solid line) and impulse response function to government
spending shock identied similarly but no Ramey variable included on the right hand side
of the VAR equation (dashed line), which would be similar to the case shown in Fatas and
Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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9.3 Identication of parameters
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Figure 8: This gure shows a graphical exercise to see if the parameters being estimated
are identied. The objective function Ln(), as dened in Section 4, is plotted on the y-axis
while  is varied on the x-axis. In this gure all parameters are xed at the estimated values
for the baseline model with deep habits, while one parameter in  is varied at a time.
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9.4 Complete set of symmetric competitive equilibrium conditions
in a model with deep habits
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w1 ~t = (1  ~) ~w1 ~t + ~w1 ~t 1

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t
1 ~
(A-23)
t = gt (A-24)
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csCt 1 + (1  c)ct (A-25)
sGt = 
gsGt 1 + (1  g)gt (A-26)
and the exogenous process for government spending and Taylor monetary rule.
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and the exogenous process for government spending and Taylor monetary rule.
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